This paper investigates how underwriters set the IPO firm's fair value, an ex-ante estimate of the market value, using a unique dataset of 228 reports from French underwriters. These reports are issued before the IPO shares start trading on the stock market and detail how underwriters determined fair value. We document that underwriters often employ multiples valuation, dividend discount models and discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis to determine fair value but that all of these valuation methods suffer from a positive bias with respect to equilibrium market value.We also analyze how this fair value estimate is subsequently used as a basis for IPO pricing. We report that underwriters deliberately discount the fair value estimate when setting the preliminary offer price. Part of the intentional price discount can be recovered by higher price updates. We find that, controlling for other factors such as investor demand, part of underpricing stems from this intentional price discount.
Introduction
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is beset by price discovery problems. Issuers therefore hire an investment bank to underwrite the securities issue (Baron, 1982) . Since underwriters are repeat players in the new issues market, they have an incentive to certify that the offer price reflects all available and relevant inside information about past and future payoffs (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995) . In this paper, we investigate how French underwriters set the IPO firm'sfair value, an ex-ante estimate of the market value,using a dataset of hand-collected underwriter reports. Moreover, we analyze how this fair value estimate is subsequently used as a basis for IPO pricing.
We obtain reports from underwriters that give us detailed valuation analyses for a sample of 228 IPOs on NYSE Euronext Paris during the years 1990-1999. These underwriter reports are issued before the shares start to trade on the stock market and are typically sent to investors together with the preliminary IPO prospectus. Unlike previous U.S. studies, this allows us to assess the pre-IPO valuation process used by investment bankers in practice.
Moreover, we have access to unique data since cash flow forecasts of U.S. IPO firms are generally unavailable in SEC documents (Kaplan and Ruback, 1995) . Specifically, underwriters in the United States can only comment on the valuation and provide earnings estimates after the quiet period of 25 calendar days after the IPO date has expired (Bradley et al., 2003) . This paper makes two importantcontributions to the literature. The first contribution is thatwe compare the bias, accuracy and explainabilityof threecommonequity valuation techniques used by underwriters: multiples valuation,dividend discount model valuation and discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation. This differs from Kim and Ritter (1999) andPurnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) who only consider the use of multiples valuation and do not have access to pre-IPO reports that detail how underwriters exactly value the companies they bring public.
The second contribution of this paper is that we observe the intentional price discount that underwriters apply to arrive at the preliminary offer price before investor participation in the pricing process.Existing theories on IPO underpricing are based on issuers deliberately selling shares below their fair value to encourage investor participation and price discovery (e.g., Rock, 1986; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Shiller, 1990) . However, empirically it is difficult to measure which part of IPO underpricing is due to deliberately setting offer prices too low (Shiller, 1990) .Wetake a first step in this direction. Unlike previous studies this allows us to investigate to which degree the intentional price discount contributes to IPO underpricing after controlling for other factors such as investor demand.
Our results show that underwriters often use multiples valuation, dividend discount models and discounted cash flow models to determine fair value. We find that these three valuation techniques have similar bias, accuracy and explainability. Underwriters deliberately discount the fair value estimate when setting the preliminary offer price. Underwriters advertize this price discount in an attempt to augment investor participation in the auction or bookbuilding process. This results in higher price updates of the preliminary offer price that partially recover the discount. However, there is not a full adjustment but only a partial recovery of the intentional price discount. Consistent with the partial adjustment phenomenon part of the deliberate price discount remains and contributes to higher underpricing after controlling for other factors such as investor demand.
The outline of our paper is as follows. Section two briefly reviews the existing literature and positions our paper. Section three describes our data. Section four presents the results. Section five concludes.
Prior literature
The valuation of IPOs has received limited attention in the literature. Kim and Ritter (1999) investigate how the offer prices of U.S. IPO firms are set by selecting multiples from recent IPOs of firms from the same industry. They report that forward price-earnings multiples dominate all other multiples in valuation accuracy, and that the earnings per share forecast for next year dominates the use of current year earnings. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) take a similar approach and find the median U.S. IPO firm is overvalued by about 50% relative to its industry peers. Houston et al. (2006) study the target prices established by analysts one month after the IPO and argue that this indicates how U.S. investment bankers value IPOs. They infer that offer prices are set at a discount of 10 percent compared to the mean comparable firm multiple used to set the target price one month later. However, this discount is not significantly different from zero.
The above studies focus on multiples valuation and ignore the other valuation techniques such as discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation that underwriters use in practice (Mills, 2005) . A notable exception is offered by Kaplan and Ruback (1995) who compare the performance of the discounted cash flow estimates to that of estimates obtained from valuation approaches that rely on companies in similar industries and companies involved in similar transactions. The discounted cash flow methods, individually, perform at least as well as the comparable methods. However, their findings should be interpreted with caution since they are only able to retrieve cash flow forecasts for eight IPOs that previously completed highly leveraged transactions.
Our study adds to thisliterature because it makes use of a large sample of underwriter reports that are published before rather than after the IPO. In contrast to Houston et al. (2006) , we therefore do not need to assume that ex-post valuations of analysts are representative of how underwriters value IPOs ex-ante. In addition, previous IPO valuation studies (Kim and Ritter, 1999; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004) estimate the value of IPO firms using their own techniques and focus on multiples valuation. These studies assume that their results approximate the valuation process used by the underwriter. However, Liu et al. (2002) argue that the use of these algorithms could diminish the performance of multiples valuation, since the researcher selects comparable firms in a mechanical way. In contrast, underwriters may select comparable firms more carefully and take into account situationspecific factors not considered by researchers (Ritter and Welch, 2002) . Moreover, underwriters do not limit themselves to multiples valuation but generally also perform a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis of some form (Mills, 2005; Roosenboom, 2007) . Our study takes a different approach and analyzes both direct and relative valuation approaches that are widely used by underwriters in practice.
After valuing the IPO the shares need to be priced. The IPO pricing process begins after setting the preliminary offer price. The underwriter starts with canvassing investor demand for the shares during a road show or an auction. Any positive information about investor demand is used to adjust the preliminary offer price upward to arrive at the final offer price. However, in order to induce investors to truthfully reveal their private demand schedules the underwriter only partially adjusts the offer price, thus underpricing the shares to reward investors for revealing favorable private information (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989 ).
This partial adjustment phenomenon has been widely documented in the United States (Hanley, 1993; Ritter and Welch, 2002) and internationally (Derrien and Womack, 2003; Ljungqvist et al., 2003) .
Nevertheless IPO underpricing remains a puzzle. In their review, Ritter and Welch (2002) conclude that IPO underpricing is unlikely to be explained by simple fundamental market misevaluation or asset-pricing risk premia since it is unclear why investors that buy the shares on the first day of trading would require such a premium whereas investors on the second day would no longer demand it. They also doubt whether IPO underpricing can be understood by an equilibrium compensation for private information revelationas suggested by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) . Welch(2002, page 1803) conclude that "the solution to the underpricing puzzle has to lie in focusing on the setting of the offer price".Shiller (1990) also argues that looking at the setting of the offer price is important. His survey results show thatmost IPO investors do not extensively research the companies they invest in but instead rely on the reputation of the underwriter to certify fundamental value.
In this paper, we explore this reason for IPO underpricing, namely that underwriters apply an intentional price discount to their fair value estimate of IPO shares when setting the preliminary offer price (Shiller, 1990; Roosenboom, 2007) . Such a deliberate discount allows underwriters to expend less market effort and to ingratiate themselves with buy-side clients such as institutional investors (Baron, 1982) and increase investor demand above the level it would normally have been (Shiller, 1990) .Because the issuer cannot monitor the underwriter without cost they trust the underwriters' pricing decision and consider IPOunderpricing as a necessary cost of going public. This argument has not been tested in the existing literature because it requires data access to the intentional price discount.Our paper aims to fill this gap and investigates whether underwriters intentionally discount their fair value estimate to induce investors to reveal their private information in the pricing process. We then investigate to which degree the deliberate price discount explains IPO underpricing controlling for other factors including investors' demand.
Data and sample description

Sample construction
We identify all newly listed firms from January 1990 to December 1999 from L'AnnéeBoursière, an annual publication of the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF), and the SDC New Issues Database. Table 1 shows our selection criteria.We do not include 24 firms that listed on the Premier Marché (the most prestigious listing venue in France) because these mostly involve privatization, equity carve-outs or spin-offs. We also exclude 29 firms that transfer from the Marché hors-cote (an over-the-counter market that existed until 1998), or that previously traded on a foreign stock market because these firms already had a price established for their shares such that price discovery is simple. For the same reason, 18 firms that listed either on one of the six regional stock exchanges (Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Nantes, and Nancy) or on the Marché Libre(an unregulated trading platform 
Firm and offer characteristics
We first examine the industry distribution for our sample of 228 IPO firms (not tabulated).
We classify our firms into Fama and French (1997) industries. Our sample consists of many different industries of which business services (22.8%), wholesale trade (9.2%) and retail (5.7%) are the most important. We identify technology firms following the approach of Loughran and Ritter (2004) . 2 We observe that 22.8% of our sample firms are active in the technology sector.
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
3.3.Valuation techniques used
In this section, we describe the pre-IPO valuation process. 4 Figure 1 provides an overview. At the outset, the underwriter establishes a fair value estimate using one or more valuation 3 We base the annual market share on the original sample of 309 companies that went public during 1990-1999.
In unreported tests, we have also used the underwriter market share in the three years before the IPO year and the market share during the entire sample period taking into account name changes of underwriters because of mergers and acquisitions in the underwriting industry. We find similar results using these alternative measures of underwriter market share. 4 A detailed description of the valuation techniques can be found in text books such as Penman (2001) and Damodaran (2002 Table 3 shows that the dividend discount models are used to estimate the equity value of the IPO in 135 cases (59.2%). Table 3 also shows that there are 135 cases (59.2%) in whichthe discounted cash flow analysis is used to estimate the equity value of the IPO. This fraction is much higher than the use of discounted cash flow analysis among U.S. analysts and investment banks (DeAngelo, 1990; Asquith et al., 2005; Houston at al., 2006) .
[Please insert Figure 1 and Table 3 about here]
We also document the use of economic value added valuation. We find that its use is not as widespread with 19.3% of underwriters employing this method. Underwriters sometimes base fair value estimates on underwriter-specific valuation techniques such as discounting sales, discounting earnings, sum-of-the-parts valuation etc. These underwriterspecific techniques are used in 11.4% of the cases.
We also determine the conditional and unconditional weights underwriters apply to the estimated values of the different methods when arriving at their fair value estimate. The second column of Table 3 shows that multiples valuation is given the highest weight followed by the dividend discount model and the discounted cash flow model. The economic value added and underwriter-specific techniques play a minor role. The third column of Table 3 shows that among the different multiples, the price-earnings multiple is the most important one. In a typical underwriter report, the underwriter aggregates the value estimates of the different multiples together into one value estimate. In subsequent analyses we use this composite value estimate for reasons of brevity.
Valuing and pricing IPOs
The IPO valuation and pricing process starts with the fair value estimate, which serves as an ex-ante estimate of 'true' or market value [See Figure 1 ]. Table 4 shows that the underwriter estimates the average [median] fair value of the IPO firm's equity to be €71.7million Table 4 also shows the value estimates derived from the individual valuation methods. After the underwriter has determined the fair value estimate he applies a deliberate price discount to come to the preliminary offer value. Thisintentional price discount equals 18.2 percent both evaluated at the mean and the median. The deliberate price discount is often advertised in the underwriter report. For example: "The preliminary offer price offers a substantial discount from our fair value estimate. We therefore issue a strong buy recommendation for this stock".
[Please insert Table 4 about here] auctioned IPOs. 5 The preliminary prices are set before the underwriter learns about investor demand for the IPO. Our sample also contains 19 fixed-price offerings for which we set the preliminary offer price equal to the final offer price. On average, the minimum tender price for IPO auctions and the price range for bookbuilt IPOs are chosen two weeks before the shares start trading on the stock market (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002; Derrien and Womack, 2003) . It is at about this time the underwriter reports are released. The fixed-price in fixed price offerings is set about one week before the IPO date.
As a next step, the underwriter collects information about investor demand for the shares. This new information is used to adjust the preliminary offer price to arrive at the final offer price. In France, the quotation of the stock during the first trading day is suspended in case of a too large increase in the stock price (the market is said to be reserved) and trades can reopen only several days after the IPO day with a higher clearing price (Derrien and Womack, 2003) . 6 Equilibrium market value is determined as the number of shares outstanding after the IPO times the market equilibrium price at which shares transact. The market equilibrium prices are provided by François Derrien and used in Derrien and Womack (2003) 
Empirical results
Valuing IPOs
In this section we document the bias, accuracy and explainability of the valuation methods applied by underwriters in our sample. This follows the approach of Francis et al. (2000) who argue that it is important to assess bias, accuracy as well as explainability of valuation methods.
Signed prediction errors (bias)
We first calculate signed prediction errors of each valuation method as the (estimated valueequilibrium market value)/equilibrium market value. 7 Assuming an efficient stock market, these prediction errors capture the bias associated with the different methods. Panel A of Table 5 shows that most methods are associated with positive average and median prediction errors that are significantly different from zero. We also observe that the fraction of observations with positive prediction errors exceeds 50% for all valuation methods.
[Please insert observe that thecomparable firms/transaction multiple method is the least biased valuation method. However, one problem with comparing the bias across methods is that certain valuation methods will be more appropriate than others. The underwriter decides which methods are appropriate to value the IPO stock and which are not. For example, the difference between the signed prediction error of the multiples method and the dividend discount model could be caused by companies for which the underwriter uses the multiples method but not the discounted dividend model.For the 120 firms where the underwriter uses both methods, the results might differ from those reported in Panel A. We therefore reexamine bias using a pairwise comparison of the three most important valuation methods (multiples, dividend discount models and discounted cash flow valuation). A drawback is that sample sizes are reduced. Panel B of Table 5 shows the results. We find that the average and median prediction error (bias) are not statistically different from each other.
high multiples if they desire high offer values and choose comparable firms with low multiples if they do not want the IPO to look overpriced (Kim and Ritter, 1999) . More importantly, the prediction error would include the deliberate price discount that underwriters apply to the fair value estimate to set the offer value.
Absolute prediction errors (accuracy)
We also compute absolute prediction errors as |(estimated value-equilibrium market value)/equilibrium market value|. Absolute prediction errors measure the valuation accuracy of the different methods. We investigate central tendency defined as the percentage of observations with absolute prediction errors of 15% or less. This 15% threshold is widely used in the literature (Kaplan and Ruback, 1995; Kim and Ritter, 1999; Gilson et al., 2000) .
Panel A of [Please insert Table 6 about here]
Panel B of Table 6 shows the results of a pairwise comparison between the accuracy of the different valuation methods. It reveals no statistically significant differences in the absolute prediction errors (accuracy). We conclude that there are only few differences in the average and median accuracy across different valuation methods.This confirms the results of Kaplan and Ruback (1995) whoshow that the multiples approach and the discounted cash flow valuation perform equally well. However, theiranalysis excludes the dividend discount model and applies to a small sample of highly leveraged transactions in the United States and is therefore not strictly comparable to our large sample evidence on French IPOs.
Valuation regressions (explainability)
Besides bias and accuracy, we also examine explainability, defined as the ability of value estimates to explain cross-sectional variation in equilibrium market values. For this purpose we conduct a Wald-test to test the joint hypothesis that the intercept equals zero and the slope equals one. If the value estimates are unbiased predictors of market values, then the intercept should equal zero and the slope be one. We report the results in Table 7 .
In the regression we regress the natural logarithm of the equilibrium market value on the natural logarithm of the value estimate. Table 7 shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the slope coefficient equals one for any of the valuation methods. However, the Wald-statistic shows that the joint hypothesis of an intercept equal to zero and a slope coefficient equal to one is rejected for all valuation methods as well as the fair value estimate.
On the surface, none of valuation methodsor the fair value estimate therefore produces an unbiased estimate of market value. On inspection of the explanatory power of the different models, we find that the dividend discount model has highest explanatory power and the economic value added methodis associated with the lowest explanatory power.
[Please insert Tables 7 and 8 about here]
In Table 8 we investigate whether underwriters can improve their valuation estimate when using different valuation methods together. We limit ourselves to the three most popular techniques for which we have sufficient number of observations (multiples valuation, the dividend discount model and the discounted cash flow model). The incremental R 2 is the difference between the adjusted R 2 for the OLS regression containing both value estimates and the adjusted R 2 for the OLS regression which excludes the valuation method in the noted column. We find that adding an additional method increases the explanatory power of the model significantly for all combinations.Nevertheless, the Wald-test continues to reject that the two methods together are producing an unbiased estimate of market value.
These results prompt the question why underwriters deliberately overestimate the fair value with respect to the equilibrium market value. We argue that one of the reasons underwriters engage in this behavior is because it enables them to offer a larger discount to investors. This predicts that more biased valuations are associated with higher price discounts. We indeed find a high correlation between the price discount and bias of the fair value estimate (i.e., signed prediction error) of 0.448. Next, we split the sample in three groups of low, medium and high bias fair value estimates (untabulated). gives them the opportunity to subsequently offer higher discounts to investors.
4.1.4.Cross-sectional regressions
In this section we investigate whether cross-sectional differences in bias and accuracy across IPO firms can be related to the firm and offer characteristics discussed in section 3.2. We control for difference between the two market segments by including a Nouveau Marchédummy in the OLS regressions. We define a technology dummy that equals one if the firm is active in the technology sector as defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004) .Technology firms may be more difficult to value and it is therefore important to control for this. We also include the market return and market volatility during the 100 days before the underwriter report is published to control for stock market conditions. Columns 5 to 8 of Table 9 show the results for valuation accuracy. Note that a negative regression coefficient indicates higher accuracy (i.e. lower absolute prediction errors). Valuation accuracy is improved (i.e., the absolute prediction is error is lower) when issuers are older and underwriters have a higher reputation. Underwriters seem to more accurately value older companies with established track recordsbut are less accurate when the stock market is more volatile. There are no other firm and offer characteristicsbesides company age, underwriter reputation and pre-valuation market volatility that can consistently explain the cross-sectional variation in accuracy.
[Please insert Table 9 about here]
Pricing IPOs
In this section we investigate how the fair value estimate is used for subsequent IPO pricing.
We have already documented that the underwriter deliberately applies a price discount to this fair value estimate when setting the preliminary offer price. We first investigate whether this deliberate price discount can be related to firm and offer characteristics and then see how this intentional price discount impacts price updates and underpricing.
Intentional price discounts
The first column of Table 10 shows that high reputation underwriters are associated with lower intentional price discounts. This can be explained by the fact that an underwriter with larger market share probably has a more extended network and access to a large pool of potential investors. They do not have to offer high discounts in order to get investors interested in buying shares in the IPO but use their reputation to certify the quality of the issuer (Carterand Manaster, 1990) . The price discount is also lower for firms that are forecasted to be more profitable. Underwriters do not have to offer high discounts to interest investors inthe shares of IPO firms that are expected to show strong profitability in the future.
Interestingly, ex-ante risk proxies such as firm age and the technology dummy turn out to be insignificant. This suggests that the intentional price discount is not primarily used to compensate investors for risk. None of the other firm and offer characteristics is significant.
We also include a variable that measures the average absolute prediction errors (accuracy) of fair value estimates in the 100 trading days before the publishing date of theunderwriter report. This captures how accurate valuation techniques are in the past period. We find that underwriters discount the fair value estimate more when the average absolute prediction errors were high in the 100 days before (i.e. accuracy was low). Underwriters therefore offer higher discounts at a time when valuation techniques generateless accurate value estimates.Market return and market volatility during the 100 trading days before the underwriter report was published do not significantly impact the price discount.
[Please insert Table 10 about here]
Price updates
The next step in the pricing process is that the underwriters collect information about investor demand for the IPO. If the underwriter learns positive information about investor demand this will result in a positive price update.Next to firm and offer characteristics we add two new variables. We measure the pre-pricing market return and the pre-pricing market volatility between the date the underwriter report was published and the date the final offer price was set. This information arrives after the publishing date of the underwriter report and therefore could not have been incorporated into the fair value estimate but is likely to impact the price update. The second column of Table 10 displays the results. We report that price updates are higher for companies with higher forecasted sales growth. Price updates are higher when stock market returns are higher and lower when the stock market index is more volatile. A unique feature of the French IPO market is that shares are sold via single-bid auctions (Derrien and Womack, 2003) . There are 81 sample firms that go public via an auction. The auction dummy is significantly positive suggesting that auctions are associated with higher price updates. This confirms the results of Derrien and Womack (2003) . More importantly, the intentional discount is positively related to the price update as well. This suggests that underwriters deliberately discount the fair value estimate in order to augment investor demand. Investors are then more likely to bid up the price of the shares in the auction or bookbuilding procedure. Part of the discount can thus be recouped through higher price updates of the preliminary offer price. A one standard deviation increase in the intentional price discount increases the price update with 1.9 percentage points. This increase makes up more than 41 percent of the average price update.
Underpricing
The third column of Table 10 shows the results for the underpricing regression. We find that older companies are associated with lower levels of underpricing. Technology firms experience higher levels of underpricing. Other firm characteristics do not seem to significantly impact underpricing. Companies going public via auctions experience less underpricing as shown by Derrien and Womack (2003) before. Again we add two new variables that measure market return and market volatility but this time during the interval between the setting of the final offer price and the first day of trading. This information cannot be incorporated into the final offer price because it arrives afterwards. We find that underpricing is higher if the market return during this interval is higher.
Price updates are positively related to underpricing. This is consistent with the partial adjustment phenomenon first documented by Hanley (1993) and prior French evidence from Derrien and Womack (2003) . Without partial adjustment investors have no incentive to disclose their private demand in the auction or bookbuildingprocedure because they know that showing an interest to buy IPO shares will drive up the offer price. This problem may be offset, if underwriters only partially adjust the offer price to positive information, as to reward investors with underpriced shares.
The intentional price discount also has a positive impact on underpricing. This suggests that part of underpricing is due to underwriters deliberately discounting the price to augment investor interest. Although part of the deliberate price discount is recouped by higher price updates it remains an important driver of underpricing. A one standard deviation increase in the deliberate price discount increases underpricing by 2.6 percentage points. This increase makes up 20 percent of the average underpricing. Other firm and offer characteristics are insignificant.
Part of underpricing therefore seems to be a compensation for investors to disclose their demand for IPO shares. Another part of underpricing can be attributed to an intentional price discount that occurs before any information about investor demand is collected.
Underwriters use this intentional price discount to augment investor demand. This results in higher price updates that partially regain the discount. However, consistent with the partial adjustment phenomenon there is not a full adjustment. Part of the deliberate price discount remains and results in higher returns for investors. In column 4 of Table 10 we redefine underpricing as the percentage difference between the market capitalization 10 days after the equilibrium price has been established and the final offer value. We find similar results as before.
As a final point, we control for investors' demand in our underpricing regressions.
Wemeasure investor demand by oversubscription rates (i.e., total shares demanded in the IPO/total shares that are sold in the IPO). 9 We have been able to collect information on 9 Derrien (2005) usesindividual investor's oversubscription ratios to measure investor sentiment. However, individual investors' oversubscription ratios are only available for French IPO firms that use a modified bookbuilding procedure called the Offreà Prix Ouvert (OPO). We cannot use these individual investors' oversubscription ratios given that this IPO selling procedure was introduced in 1999 and only two of our sample firms use this procedure. We therefore use total investor demand as a proxy for investor sentiment in this paper.
In unreported tests, we find that IPOs that are in the top tercile of oversubscription have lower average 2-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (starting on the 11 th trading day) than IPOs in the lower two terciles of oversubscription. However, there is no significant difference when we compare median buy-and-hold abnormal returns. IPOs that are in the top tercile of oversubscription also more frequently have an equilibrium market price above the fair value estimate of the underwriter. This suggests that oversubscription rates capture at least some part of investor sentiment.
oversubscription rates for a sample of 118 IPO firms. The average [median] oversubscription rate equals 30.9 [15] . Table 10 , column (5) shows the results. We find that oversubscription rates are significantly and positively related to underpricing. A one standard deviation increase in the oversubscription rate increases underpricing by 6.3 percentage points, other things equal. In comparison, a one standard deviation increase in price discount contributes 2.9 percentage points to underpricing, other things equal.
Robustness checks
An obvious problem with our analysis is endogeneity. For example, the partial adjustment phenomenon suggests that price updates and underpricing should be estimated simultaneously, because the underwriter's pricing decision depends on how much money he has to leave on the table to ensure that investors truthfully reveal their demand for IPO shares during the auction or the pre-market phase of the bookbuilding process. Similar endogenous relationships can exist between the intentional price discount and the price update and the intentional price discount and underpricing. We therefore test for these potential endogeneity problems using the Davidson-MacKinnon (1993) test. This test can be formed by including the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side variable, as a function of all exogenous variables, in a regression of the original model and then testing whether the coefficient on the residuals are significantly different from zero. The test statistic indicates no evidence for an endogenous relation between underpricing and the intentional price discount (p-value=0.56), between underpricing and the price update (p-value=0.77 ) and between the price update and the intentional price discount (p-value=0.15 ). This indicates that the OLS regressions in section 4.2.3 produce consistent coefficient estimates.
We also repeat our entire analysis for the group of 81 auctioned IPOs and the group of 128 bookbuilt IPOs separately. We find qualitatively similar findings for both subsamples.
We also split the sample into a companies going public on the Nouveau Marchéand theSecond Marché. We find similar results for both market segments.
Conclusions
This paper is one of the first to investigate how underwriters set the IPO firm's fair value, an ex-ante estimate of the market value, and how these underwriters subsequently use their fair value estimate as a basis for IPO pricing. We obtain a unique dataset consisting of 228 underwriter reports of IPO firms on NYSE Euronext Paris.Our results show that underwriters typically arrive at a fair value estimate by usingmultiples valuation, dividend discount models and discounted cash flow models to value the IPO firm.There is not one single valuation technique that stands out in being less positively biased or more accurate than the others.
Underwriters discount their biased fair value estimate to arrive at the preliminary offer value. These discounts are lower for higher reputation underwriters and, controlling for other factors, are associated with higher price updates. We find that the decision of the underwriter and issuer to offer price discountsis associated with higher underpricing.
We conclude that it is important to know how underwriters set offer prices in order to better understand why IPO underpricing exists. This corresponds to the view of Ritter and Welch (2002) who concludethat "the solution to the underpricing puzzle has to lie in focusing on the setting of the offer price" (page 1803).We take a first step in this direction and examine how underwriters value IPOs and set offer prices in practice. A key insight is that underwriters set preliminary offer prices by applying a discount to their fair market value estimate. This price discount is not fully recovered later in the valuation and pricing process and therefore contributes to IPO underpricing. We also find that most underwriters do not exclusively rely on multiples valuation when valuing IPOs. This contrasts with the IPO literature that mostly studiesmultiples valuation (e.g. Kim and Ritter, 1999; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004; Houston et al., 2006) . Future research should therefore pay more attention to other widely used direct valuation methods such as discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis and how underwriters set offer prices. Note: We started with the complete universe of French newly listed firms from January 1990 to December 1999. New listings were identified by L'AnnéeBoursière, an annual publication of the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) and the SDC New Issues Database. We excluded 24 domestic firms that listed on the Premier Marché (the most prestigious listing venue in France), because they generally involved privatization, equity carve-outs or spinoffs. Twenty-nine firms that transferred from the Marché hors-cote (an over-the-counter market that existed until 1998), or that previously traded on a foreign stock market, are excluded because their price discovery is straightforward. We dropped 26 financial services firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) because their reporting environments are very different from those of other newly listed firms. For the same reason, 18 firms that listed either on one of the six regional stock exchanges (Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Nantes, and Nancy) or on the MarchéLibre(an unregulated trading platform in France) were dropped. A total of 81 companies with no underwriter reports available were excluded as a final step. The filters resulted in a sample of 228 non-financial French firms that had an Initial Public Offering (IPO) on either the Nouveau Marché or the Second Marché of NYSE Euronext Paris. Note: The sample consists of 228 IPO firms from January 1990 to December 1999. Total assets are for the last 12 months reported in the prospectus. Company age is the number of years the company has been in existence prior to its listing. Plant, property and equipment is for the last 12 months reported in the prospectus and expressed as a percentage of total assets. Profitability is defined as the current year's forecasted earnings before interest and taxes divided by the current year's forecasted sales as reported in the underwriter report. Sales growth is the forecasted sales growth during the current year and is taken from the underwriter report. Dividend policy is from the IPO prospectus and is defined as the percentage of net income the firm intends to pay out as dividends in the future. Underwriter market share is measured as the sum of gross proceeds (excluding over-allotment option) raised in all IPOs lead managed by the underwriter j divided by the total proceeds raised during the year of the IPO. The dilution factor is defined as the number of newly issued shares at the IPO divided by the number of pre-IPO shares outstanding. The participation ratio is computed as the number of existing shares sold by pre-IPO shareholders divided by the number of pre-IPO shares. Proceeds are calculated as the number of shares offered to the public times the final offer price. We use the French Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) to express all money amounts in constant euro terms for the year 1999. Table shows the distribution of valuation and pricing variables. Sample sizes (N) vary depending on the particular valuation method(s) that the underwriter uses. Fair value estimate is taken from the underwriterreport and can be viewed as an ex-ante estimate of the market capitalization. The value estimates of the different valuation techniques are also hand-collected from underwriter reports. The deliberate price discount is computed as (fair value estimate -preliminary offer value)/fair value estimate. Preliminary offer value is computed as the number of shares outstanding after the IPO times the preliminary offer price. The preliminary offer price equals the midpoint of the price range for 128 IPOs that use the bookbuilding procedure. The preliminary offer price is set equal to the minimum tender price for 81 IPO auctions. The preliminary price equals the fixed-offer price for 19 fixed-price offerings. The price update is defined as (final offer value -preliminary offer value)/preliminary offer value.Final offer value is calculated as the number of shares outstanding after the IPO times the final offer price. Equilibrium market value is determined as the number of shares outstanding after the IPO times the market equilibrium price. The market equilibrium price is the first clearing price at which shares transact. The market equilibrium prices are provided by François Derrien and used in Derrien and Womack (2003) for the period 1992-1998 and fromNYSE Euronext Paris for the other years. Underpricing is calculated as (equilibrium market value -final offer value)/final offer value. We use the French Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) to express all money amounts in constant euro terms for the year 1999. Note:Signed prediction errors are measured in percent as (estimated value-equilibrium market value)/equilibrium market value. We test whether the average and median signed prediction error is statistically different from zero using a standard t-test for means and the Wilcoxon signed rank test for medians. In Panel B we conduct a pairwise comparison between the various equity valuation methods using samples of firms that are valued using the two particular equity valuation methods under consideration. We perform a t-test to test whether the differences in average bias are statistically significant. Medians are reported in brackets. We perform a nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank test to test for equality of medians. a significant at the 1% level; b significant at the 5% level; c significant at the 10% level. Sample sizes (N) vary depending on the particular valuation technique(s) that the underwriter uses. Note: Absolute prediction errors are measured in percent as |(estimated value -equilibrium market value)/equilibrium market value|. Central tendency is percentage of observations with absolute prediction error of 15% or less. We test whether the average and median absolute prediction error is statistically different from zero using a standard t-test for means and the Wilcoxon signed rank test for medians. In Panel B we use samples of firms that are valued using the two particular equity valuation methods under consideration. We perform a t-test to test whether the differences in average accuracy are statistically significant. Medians are reported in brackets. We perform a nonparametric Wilcoxon-MannWhitney rank test to test for equality of medians. a significant at the 1% level; b significant at the 5% level; c significant at the 10% level. Sample sizes (N) vary depending on the particular valuation technique(s) that the underwriter uses. Note: OLS regressions with the natural log of the equilibrium market value as the dependent variable and the natural log of the estimated value using the different valuation methods as the independent variables. We use the French Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) to express all money amounts in constant euro terms for the year 1999. The Wald-test tests the joint hypothesis that the intercept equals zero and the sum of the slopes equals one. t-statistics using White (1980) heteroscedastic standard errors are in parentheses and test whether the intercept is statistically different from zero and the slope coefficients are statistically significant from one. We test whether the explanatory power of the model is increased by adding another valuation method. The incremental R 2 is the difference between the adjusted R 2 for the OLS regression containing both value estimates and the adjusted R 2 for the OLS regression which excludes the valuation method in the noted column. We test whether the increase in explanatory power is significant using a F-test. The F-statistic is reported in parentheses. a significant at the 1% level; b significant at the 5% level; c significant at the 10% level. Sample sizes (N) vary depending on the particular valuation technique(s) that the underwriter uses in combination. Loughran and Ritter (2004) .Prevaluation market return and the pre-valuation market volatility relate to the market index buy-and-hold return and standard of deviation of daily market index returns in the period of 100 trading days before the underwriter report was released. We used the MSCI France index to compute marketreturns.See Table 2 for other variable definitions. a significant at the 1% level; b significant at the 5% level; c significant at the 10% level. Sample sizes (N) vary depending on the particular valuation technique(s) that the underwriter uses. Loughran and Ritter (2004) .The average absolute prediction error is calculated as the average absolute prediction error (accuracy) of fair value estimates in the 100 trading days before the publishing date of the underwriter report. Pre-valuation market return and the pre-valuation market volatility relate to the market index buy-and-hold return and standard of deviation of daily market index returns in the period of 100 trading days before the underwriter report was released. Pre-pricing market return and the pre-pricing market volatility relate to the market index buy-and-hold return and standard of deviation of daily market index returns between the date the underwriter report was published and the date the final offer price was set. The auction dummy equals one in case the IPO was sold via an auction. Post-pricing market return and the post-pricing market volatility relate to the buyand-hold market index returnand standard of deviation of daily market index returns during the interval between the setting of the final offer price and establishing the equilibrium market price. We used the MSCI France index to compute market returns.Underpricing, 10 days is calculated as (market value 10 days after the equilibrium market value has been established-final offer value)/final offer value. Oversubscription rate is the number of times the IPO was oversubscribed measured as total shares demanded/shares offered in the IPO. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. a significant at the 1% level; b significant at the 5% level; c significant at the 10% level. Sample sizes (N) vary depending on data availability.
